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without presupposing the no-miracles argument. 
 
1. NMA, PMA and the Correspondence Theorem 
 
The contemporary debate on scientific instrumentalism versus realism is domi-
nated by the influence of two strong arguments which pull into opposite direc-
tions. On the one side we have the no-miracles argument (NMA), suggested e.g. 
by Putnam (1975, 73), which says that the empirical success of contemporary 
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scientific theories would be a sheer miracle if we would not assume that their 
theoretical superstructure, or ontology, is approximately true in the sense of sci-
entific realism. On the other side, there is the pessimistic meta-induction argu-
ment (PMA), put forth by Laudan (1981), which points to the fact that in the his-
tory of scientific theories one can recognize radical changes at the level of theo-
retical superstructures (ontologies), although there was continuous progress at 
the level of empirical success. On simple inductive grounds, one should expect 
therefore that the theoretical superstructures (ontologies) of our presently ac-
cepted theories will also be overthrown in the future, and hence can in no way 
be expected to be approximately true.   
  I start this paper with a concession to the anti-realist camp: it is doubtful 
whether the NMA in its unrestricted form is a reliable argument (additional rea-
sons for this doubt are given below). In this paper I will present a logical argu-
ment which is independent from the NMA and allows us to infer, under certain 
conditions, from the empirical success of a theory its partial truth, relative to a 
theory T* which preserves T's empirical success and is assumed as true, or at 
least closer to the truth than T. My argument is based on relations of correspon-
dence between historically consecutive theories with increasing (or at least not 
decreasing) empirical success. Boyd (1984) and other philosophers of science 
have emphasized the existence of such relations of correspondence, which re-
flect that even on the theoretical level something is preserved through historical 
theory change and, thus, has a justified realist interpretation. Laudan (1981, 121, 
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126), however, has objected that there is no evidence for systematic relations of 
correspondence at the theoretical level. He has given a much debated list of 
counterexamples - examples of scientific theories which were strongly success-
ful at their time but whose ontology was incompatible with that of contemporary 
theories, from which Laudan concludes that these theories cannot possibly cor-
respond to contemporary theories. In Schurz (2009) it is argued that Laudan is 
wrong: there are indeed systematic reasons for relations of theory-
correspondence, which are based on the fact that under natural conditions the 
cumulatively increasing empirical success of theories entails constraints on their 
theoretical superstructure from which one can obtain such relations of corre-
spondence. Schurz (2009, “ 4) proves a correspondence theorem which presup-
poses the following conditions to be satisfied for the predecessor theory T and 
the successor theory T* (both viewed as sets of sentences of an interpreted lan-
guage): 
  (Condition 1 on T and T*): The theories T and T* share a common non-
theoretical vocabulary in which their joint empirical (or non-theoretical) success 
is expressed, and they share a partitioned domain of application A = A1È¼ÈAn , 
with n³ 2, whose (disjoint) subdomains Ai are described by antecedent condi-
tions Ai expressed by the shared non-theoretical vocabulary. 
 (Condition 2 on T): (2.1): The predecessor theory T has strong potential em-
pirical success w.r.t. partitioned domain A = A1È¼ÈAn, which means by defi-
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nition that T entails a set of conditionals S(T) = {Si,j: 1£i¹j£n} of the form  
 
 (Si,j) ("x): ($u)Ai(x,u)Ù±Ri[x,u] ® ("u)(Aj(x,u)®±Rj[x,u]). 
 In words: If Ri has happened in circumstances Ai, then Rj will happen  
 in circumstances Aj.  
  
Notation: x and u are (sequences of) individual variables, x refer(s) to the sys-
tem under consideration, u are non-theoretical auxiliary variables, e.g. the time 
variable (but possibly empty), the antecedent conditions Ai describe the condi-
tions of the subdomains, the Ri describe typical reactions of the system x in the 
subdomain Ai expressed in the shared non-theoretical vocabulary and "±" means 
either "unnegated" or "negated" (i.e., ± Î {emptystring, Ø}). Round brackets 
"A(v)" indicate that formula A contains all of the variable(s) in v, while square 
brackets R[v] mean that R may contain only some variables in v - this is needed 
for sufficiently flexible theory-reconstructions (see below). The conditionals (Si) 
allow one to infer from what has been observed in one domain of application 
(namely Ai ÙRi) what will happen in a different domain of application (namely, 
if Aj, then Rj), without the system x having ever been put into conditions Aj be-
fore. Therefore, the conditionals (Si) enable (potentially) novel predictions and, 
thus, serve as an example of strong empirical success.  For example, when T is 
generalized oxidation theory, A1 may describe the exposition of a metal to air 
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and water and R1 the end products of the reaction of oxidation, A2 the exposition 
of a metal to hydrochloric acid and R2 the end products of the reaction of salt-
formation, etc.  
 (2.2): The strong potential empirical success S(T) of T must have been 
yielded by a theoretical expression j of T, which means by definition that T en-
tails the set of bilateral reduction sentences B(T,j) = {Bi:1£i£n} of the form 
 
 (Bi): ("x, u):  Ai(x,u) ® (j(x) « Ri[x,u]).   
 In words: under empirical circumstances Ai, the presence of j is indicated or 
 measured by an empirical phenomenon or process Ri. 
 
It is easily seen that B(T,j) entails S(T). I understand bilateral reduction sen-
tences, differently from Carnap, in a non-reductionist sense, as ordinary meas-
urement conditions for theoretical expressions: (i) they are not analytically but 
synthetically true, (ii) they are usually not part of T's axiomatization, but are ob-
tained as consequences of a suitably rich version of the theory, and (iii) their 
logical form covers all kinds of quantitative measurement laws (via the equiva-
lence of "j(x) = ri[x,u]" with ""zÎReals: j(x)=z « ri[x,u]=z") (for details cf. 
Schurz 2009, “ 3). The ontological interpretation of the role of j as described by 
B(T,j) is the following: j figures as a measurable common cause of the observ-
able regularities or dispositions Di := ↑ if Ai, then Ri", in the sense that for all 
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1£i£n, ("x,u:)(j(x) ® (Ai(x,u)®Ri[x,u])) (cf. Schurz 2008, “  7.2). Anti-realists 
should note, however, that such a causal interpretation (which I find quite attra c-
tive) is not necessarily required by the correspondence theorem. 
 (Condition 3 on T*): The strong potential empirical success of T, S(T), must 
be entailed by T* in a T*-dependent way, which means by definition that for 
every conditional of the above form (Si,j) which follows from T there exists a 
theoretical mediator description j*i,j(x) of the underlying system x such that 
("x)($u)(Ai(x,u)Ù±Ri[x,u] ® j*i,j(x)) as well as ("x)(j*i,j(x) ® ("u)(Aj(x,u) 
®±Rj[x,u])) follow from T*.1 The need of condition 3 on T* for the proof of the 
theorem is obvious, because in order to infer from the entailment of S(T) by T* 
something about a correspondence between T's and T*'s theoretical part, we 
must assume that this entailment utilizes T*'s theoretical part. The justification 
of condition 3 follows from the fact that S(T) is a strong (potential) empirical 
success in the sense of novel predictions. From an empirical description of what 
goes on in domain Ai nothing can be concluded by means of empirical induction 
alone about what goes on in a qualitatively different domain Aj. For example, 
from observing the chemical reaction Ri of a given kind of substance (e.g. a 
metal) under the influence of oxygen (Ai), nothing can be concluded by empiri-
cal induction about the chemical reaction (Rj) of this substance under the influ-
ence of hydrochloric acid (Aj). For such an inference one needs a theoretical 
mediator description j* (e.g. the chemical structure of metals) which interpo-
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lates between (AiÙRi) and (Aj®Rj).   
 (Condition 4 on T and T*): The two theories T and T* must be causally nor-
mal w.r.t. the partitioned domain A = A1È¼ÈAn, which means by definition 
that: (a) the shared non-theoretical vocabulary of T and T* divides into a set of 
independent and a set of dependent parameters (predicates or function terms), 
(b) the descriptions 'Ai(x)' of the subdomains Ai are formulated solely by means 
of the independent parameters (plus logico-mathematical symbols), and (c) no 
non-trivial claim about the state of the independent parameters of a system x can 
be derived in T (or T*) from a purely T (T*)-theoretical and T (T*)-consistent 
description of x. Again, this is a natural condition - for example, nothing can be 
concluded from the theoretical nature of a certain substance about what humans 
do with it, whether they expose it to hydrochloric acid or to heat or whatever.  
 Framed in the explained terminology, the correspondence theorem now as-
serts the following (proof in Schurz 2008, “  4): 
 
Correspondence theorem: Let T be a consistent theory which is causally normal 
w.r.t. a partitioned domain A = A1È¼ÈAn and contains a T-theoretical expres-
sion j(x) which yields a strong potential empirical success of T w.r.t. partitioned 
domain A.  
 Let T* be a consistent successor theory of T (with an arbitrarily different 
theoretical superstructure) which is likewise causally normal w.r.t. partitioned 
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domain A and which entails T's strong potential empirical success w.r.t. A in a 
T*-dependent way.    
 Then T* contains a theoretical expression j*(x) such that T and T* together 
imply a correspondence relation of the form     
 (C): ("x)("u)  A(x,u) ® ( j(x) « j*(x) )    
  in words: whenever a system x is exposed to the circumstances in one of the 
 subdomains of A, then x satisfies the T-theoretical description j iff x satisfies 
  the T*-theoretical description j*.                
Remark: This implies that j(x) refers indirectly to the theoretical state of affairs 
described by j*(x) - provided j*(x) refers at all, which presupposes that T* is 
at least partially true. 
Corollary 1: B(T,j)ÈT* is consistent, and (C) follows already from 
B(T,j)ÈT*. 
Corollary 2: j* is unique in domain A modulo T*-equivalence. 
 
While the conditions 1, 3 and 4 are rather mild, condition 2 on the predecessor 
theory T is a crucial constraint which excludes pre-scientific theoretical specula-
tions. Condition 2 entails that the correspondence theorem applies to all and on-
ly those theoretical expressions j of T which yield strong potential empirical 
success by way of bilateral reduction statements. If the potential success of T is 
preserved by T* (cond. 1) in a T*-dependent way (cond. 3), and both theories 
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are causally normal (cond. 4), the correspondence relation (C) follows. Note that 
I speak of (strong) potential success because the logical derivation of the corre-
spondence theorem is independent from the factual truth values of the consid-
ered theories. The logical theorem presupposes that T entails the potential pre-
dictions S(T) which are T*-dependently preserved by T*, but it does not presup-
pose that they are factually true (should they be false, then the correspondence 
relation (C) relates theoretical concepts of two false theories). 
 It might seem to some readers that the result of the correspondence theorem 
is too good to be true. So we take pains to explain how the theorem works and to 
point to its weak spots. Implicit in corollary 1 is the possibility that the two theo-
ries T and T* are mutually incompatible, at the theoretical level, or at the em-
pirical level outside the domain of the shared empirical success. Phlogiston the-
ory (the example of our next section) was theoretically incompatible with oxy-
gen theory because it assumed the existence of phlogiston which did not exist 
according to oxygen theory. It T and T* are incompatible, then it would, of 
course, be a trivial assertion that the union of T and T* entails a correspondence 
relation (C), because in that case this union entails everything. Therefore, corol-
lary 1 tells us that the correspondence principle follows in a non-trivial way 
from a certain part of T, namely B(T,j), which is consistent with T*. Only this 
part of T, and not the whole of T, is preserved by the correspondence to T*. In 
addition, our theorem takes care of empirical incompatibilities by restricting the 
correspondence between j of T and j* of T* to a given partitioned domain A, 
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in which T was strongly successful. Outside of the domain A, T may have 
wrong empirical consequences which are not shared but corrected by T*. 
 Let us turn to the ontological interpretation of the correspondence theorem. 
The correspondence relation (C) is not meant to say that whenever T's intended 
model is realized, also T*'s intended model is realized - this would be a strange 
scenario of 'causal overdetermination'. Rather, (C) expresses the possibility of a 
j-j*-reference-shift: instead of the reference assigned to j in T's intended 
model M, we can assign to j the reference of j* in T*'s intended model M*. 
Such a j-j*-reference shift will preserve the truth of B(T,j) (proof in Schurz 
2009, “ 4). It is important, thereby, that the expression j which yielded T's 
strong success need not be a primitive term but may be a composite expression 
(and the same holds, of course, for the corresponding expression j* of T*). This 
leaves room for either an ontological underdetermination or a non-reference of 
T's primitive terms. Detailed illustrations of this situation are given at hand of 
the phlogiston-oxygen example in the next section. Also, note that I use here the 
model-theoretic notion of 'reference in an intended model of a theory T'. The 
'intended' model need not be actual ('real') but may be merely conceptual 
('imaginary'). If T's model is merely conceptual but T*'s model is actual, then 
the reference-shift provides j with 'real' instead of merely 'conceptual' refer-
ence.2 
 As mentioned above, in its causal interpretation condition 2 on T requires 
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that (strictly) correlated empirical regularities or dispositions "if Ai, then Ri" are 
explained within T by an unobservable but measurable common cause j. In 
Schurz (2008, “ 7.1) it is argued at length that it is exactly this common cause 
property which distinguishes scientifically legitimate abductions to theoretical 
entities from speculative abductions: while typical speculations postulate for 
each new phenomenon a new kind of theoretical cause, good science introduces 
new theoretical entities only if they figure as common causes of several intercor-
related phenomena. Indeed, the proof of the correspondence theorem would be 
impossible, if j were characterized by only one disposition, i.e. one bilateral re-
duction sentence A1 ® (j « R1). In Schurz (2009, “ 6) this is demonstrated by 
the example of Aristotelean physics which introduces a distinct cause for each 
kind of motion, whence no correspondence between Aristotelean and Newtonian 
physics can be established.  
 The proof of the correspondence theorem (details in Schurz 2009, “ 4) pro-
ceeds by showing that from T*'s preservation of T's strong potential success plus 
condition 3 on T* it follows that also T* contains some expression j* whose 
designatum figures as a measurable common cause of the correlated disposi-
tional properties "if Ai, then Ri". In other words, T* entails the same set of bilat-
eral reduction sentences B(T*,j*) as T entails for j (formally, B(j*,T*) = 
B(j,T)[j*/j]). Note that the requirement of T*-theoretical mediators of condi-
tion 3 enables only the derivation of two unilateral reduction sentences from T* 
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(for each Ai), one for the positive test condition (T* ||¾ (Ai ® (p* « Ri)) and 
one for the negative test condition (T* ||¾ (Ai ® (m* « ØRi)). The causal nor-
mality condition 3 is then needed to prove that T* entails (p* « Øm*); whence 
p* and Øm* can be identified and collapsed into the required T*-corresponding 
concept j*. 
 A much simpler proof of the correspondence theorem would be possible by 
replacing conditions 2 and 3 by the more direct and stronger requirement that T* 
contains a common cause explanation j* for the correlated dispositions "if Ai, 
then Ri". But this requirement would be too strong: T* need not explain the cor-
related dispositions by postulating exactly one common cause; it may also ex-
plain them by assuming a more complicated net of causes or hidden variables.3 
This is the point where corollary 2 comes into play: what can be proved with 
conditions 2 and 3 on T* is only that T* contains some measurable common 
cause, but not necessarily a unique one. T* may contain several causes j1*, ¼, 
jk* (with k £ n). Corollary 2 tells us that in such a situation T* entails that in 
domain A all these causes are equivalent, i.e. (for all 1£i¹j£k) T* ||¾ ("x,u:) A 
® (ji*(x) « jj*(x)). If we want to have a unique formal counterpart of j in T* 
in such cases, we should take the disjunction Ú1£i£kji*(x). But this formal trick 
does not remove the possible ontological ambiguity. It does not follow from co-
rollary 2 that on reasons of causal simplicity, T* will always proclaim only one 
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instead of several non-identical common causes. For the equivalence of the ji* 
which holds in domain A may fail to hold outside of domain A. It may happen 
that T* contains several counterparts of j, say j1* and j2*, which are not mutu-
ally identified by T* because although they degenerate (extensionally) into one 
cause in domain A, they split up into two distinct causes outside of the domain 
A. In the phlogiston-oxygen example of the next section, T* does indeed contain 
exactly one counterpart cause of j. But the Newton-Einstein example of section 
4 will be a situation in which T* contains two counterpart causes for j which 
are non-equivalent outside of domain A.  
 
2. Correspondence between Phlogiston Theory and Oxidation Theory 
 
The phlogiston theory of combustion was developed by J.J. Becher and his stu-
dent G.E. Stahl in the late 17th and early 18th century.4 According to this theory, 
every material which is capable of being burned or calcinated contains phlogis-
ton - a substance different from ordinary matter which was thought to be the 
bearer of combustibility. When combustion or calcination takes place, the 
burned or calcinated substance delivers its phlogiston, usually in the form of a 
hot flame or an evaporating inflammable gas, and a dephlogisticated substance-
specific residual remains. In the 1780s, Lavoisier introduced his alternative oxy-
gen theory according to which combustion and calcination consists in the oxida-
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tion of the substance being burned or calcinated, that is, in the formation of a 
chemical bond of its molecules with oxygen. The assumption of the existence of 
a special bearer of combustibility became superfluous in Lavoisier's theory. In 
modern chemistry, Lavoisier's theory is accepted in a generalized (and correc-
ted) form, and nobody believes in the existence of phlogiston any more. 
 The three major domains of application in which both phlogiston theory and 
oxidation theory were strongly successful were (1.) combustion of organic mate-
rial (which was thought to underlie also respiration and organic metabolism), 
(2.) calcination (roasting) of metals, (3.) salt-formation through the solution of 
metals in acids, and (4.) the inversion of calcination and salt-formation. The 
shared non-theoretical vocabulary of the two theories, in which these application 
domains were described, consisted of a shared classification of observable sub-
stances (metals, calx, water, acid, salts, ¼) and empirically described reactions 
(combustion, roasting, acidification, salt-formation, ¼). The different theoreti-
cal concepts and principles of the two theories concerned their theoretical de-
composition of observable substances into hypothetical and unobservable com-
ponents, which are assumed to be exchanged during chemical reaction proc-
esses. This led to a rather different theoretical analysis of the chemical reactions 
in the four domains which is summarized below. Hereby, we use the following 
chemical notation: an arrow stands for a chemical process, the substances men-
tioned left of the arrow are input substances and those right of the arrow are out-
put substances; "+" (or "-") at a substance-component denotes that the corre-
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sponding atomic or molecular group is electropositive (electronegative); '’ ' at a 
substance means that the substance is an evaporating gas; and finally, substances 
in square brackets "[ ]" are residuals which did not participate in the chemical 
reaction but were there from the start. "Ox-T" stands for "oxygen theory" and 
(later on) for the generalized "oxidation theory", "Phlog-T" for "phlogiston the-
ory.  
 Combustion and Calcination: While oxygen theory describes combustion or 
calcination of a substance X as a process of oxidation, i.e. a process in which 
oxygen is added to X, phlogiston-theory describes combustion and calcination 
of X as a process of de-phlogistication, i.e. a process in which X gives off its 
phlogiston:  
 
 Comb., Ox-T:    Carbonium + Oxygen  ®  Carb.+-Oxide- ’  [+ Ash]  
 Comb., Phlog-T:  Carbonium (= Ash-Phlog.)  ®  Ash +  Phlogiston-Air’  
 Calc., Ox-T:    Metal  +  Oxygen  ®  Calx (= Metal+-Oxide-) [+ hot air’] 
 Calc., Phlog-T:   Metal (= Calx-Phlogiston)  ®  Calx  +  Phlogiston-Air’   
 
Phlogiston theory described carbonium and metal as phlogiston-rich chemical 
compounds, while for oxidation theory both were pure substances ('elements'). 
The similar underlining (drawn-thorugh or dotted) of different substance-des-
criptions given by Ox-T and Phlog-T indicates that they describe the same em-
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pirically given substance (this convention is also used below). In the resulting 
analysis of chemical reactions, end-products and residuals sometimes exchange 
their role - for example, phlogiston theory identified the evaporating fume (car-
bon-dioxide) in the combustion of coal or organic material with phlogisticated 
air and the ash with dephlogisticated coal; while for oxidation theory only car-
bon-dioxide is the proper end-product, and the ash is a residual of incompletely 
oxidized coal. Likewise, phlogiston theory identified the upstreaming hot air in 
the calcination process as phlogisticated air, while for oxidation theory it was a 
mere byproduct. The electric polarities of the substance-compounds were not 
part of Lavoisier's oxygen theory, but are the central result of generalized 20th 
century oxidation theory, according to which oxygen as well as all other oxidiz-
ing substances attract electrons in chemical bonds and, thus, become electro-
negatively charged. 
 Salt-formation of metals with acids: For modern chemistry, every acid has 
the qualitative chemical composition 'Hyd.+-Y-, in which the hydrogenium 
atom ('Hyd.') gives off its electron to its negatively charged partner Y. If a metal 
is dissolved in acid, it takes over the role of hydrogenium and forms an ionic 
bond with the electronegative acid-component Y-. Pure hydrogenium evaporates 
as an easily inflammable gas. In contrast, phlogiston theorists described salt-
formation as a dephlogistication of the metal, in which calx and acid combine to 
form salt, while the evaporating 'inflammable air' (hydrogenium) was identified 
by Cavendish with pure phlogiston (cf. McCann 1978, 32). This phlogiston-
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analysis of salt-formation was further confirmed by the fact that by strongly 
heating the salt one could regain the calx (oxide) of the metal.   
 
 Salt-F., Ox-T: Metal + Acid (= Hyd.+-X-) ®  Metal+-X- (= salt)  + Hyd.’   
 Salt-F., Phlog-T: Metal (= Calx+Phlog.) + Acid ® Calx-Acid (= salt) + Phlog.’ 
 
Lavoisier believed erroneously that the electronegative acid-component Y must 
always contain oxygen. This is no longer assumed by generalized oxidation the-
ory - for example, in hydrochloric acid Hyd+-Cl- the electronegative chlorine 
ion Cl- (which does not contain oxygen) takes over the role of the oxidant (see 
also Hacking 1983, 9).  
 It was known from early times on that the process of calcination of metals 
can be reverted: metals can be extracted from calxes (i.e. mineral ores) through 
heating in charcoal. This process was also successfully described by both theo-
ries. Oxygen theory described this process as reduction, i.e. the inversion of the 
process of oxidation, in which the calx delivers its oxygen to the coal. In con-
trast, phlogiston theory described this process as phlogistication, i.e., the inver-
sion of the process of dephlogistication, in which the (phlogiston-rich) charcoal 
spends its own phlogiston to the calx to form a metal: 
 
    InvCalc1, Ox-T: Metal+-Ox.- + Carb. (coal) ® Metal + Carb.+-Ox.-’  [+ ash]. 
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 InvCalc1, Phlog-T:  Calx + Carb. (coal) ®   
   ® Metal (= Calx-Phlog) + Ash (= dephlog. coal) [+ Phlog-Air’]. 
 
Note that in the analysis of this reaction by Ox-T and Phlog-T, proper end-pro-
ducts and residuals exchanged their role: phlogiston theory identified the evapo-
rating fume (carbon-dioxide) with phlogisticated air (not all of the coal's phlo-
giston combines with the calx) and the ash as dephlogisticated coal; for oxygen 
theory, carbon-dioxide is a proper end-product, and the ash is a residual of in-
completely oxidized coal. 
 We now turn to the illustration of our condition (2.1) on Phlog-T. Phlogiston 
theory entails a variety of potentially novel predictions. For example, phlogiston 
theory predicts that every substance x which has been gained by the process of 
inverse calcination from a mineral ore (A1xÙR1x) is a phlogiston-rich metal and 
hence will yield a salt if dissolved in acid (A2x®R2) - even if x is was a hitherto 
unknown kind of substance which has never been put into an acid before. This is 
exactly the logical form of strong potential empirical success $t(A1xtÙR1xt)® 
"t(A2xt®R2xt) as defined in “  1.5 
 A striking example of a successful novel prediction of phlogiston theory has 
been described by Carrier (2004): after Cavendish had identified inflammable 
air with phlogiston, Priestley predicted in 1782 that it should be possible to in-
vert the process of calcination by adding inflammable air to a metal calx. He 
  20 
heated several metal calxes in inflammable air and observed that the inflamma-
ble air was almost completely absorbed and that the calxes were slowly recon-
verted into the metals. This was celebrated as a further strong success of the 
phlogiston theory. Priestley had also recorded the emergence of water droplets 
in this reaction, but he assumed that the water was contained in the inflammable 
air from the beginning (Carrier 2004, 151). Thus, Priestley has performed a new 
kind of chemical reaction, the inversion of calcination by inflammable air (in-
stead of charcoal), which is described by the two theories as follows: 
 
    InvCalc2, Ox-T: Metal+-Ox.- + Hyd. ® Metal + Water. 
 InvCalc2, Phlog-T:  Calx + Phlog [+ Water]  ®  Metal [+ Water]. 
 
The inversion principle for chemical reactions, which Priestley has used to ob-
tain his novel prediction, is a theoretical principle which was shared by Phlog-T 
and Ox-T. It can logically be reconstructed as follows: for each bilateral reduc-
tion sentence Bi describing an dephlogistication (oxidation) process, an inverted 
Bi holds, abbreviated as InvBi, which describes a phlogistication (reduction) 
process ("iÎ{1,¼,n}: Bi « InvBi). Let In(x,r) and Out(y,r) denote that x is an 
input and y an output substance of a chemical reaction r, and 'j(x,y)' stand for 
'phlogiston moves from x to y'. Then a B i for dephlogistication of x has the more 
refined form ("r,x,y): In(x,r)ÙOut(y,r)ÙA(x) ® (j(x,y)«B(y)), where A and B 
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denote kinds of substances under certain conditions, and the InvBi for phlogisti-
cation of x has the form ("r,x,y): In(y,r)ÙOut(x,r)ÙB(y) ® (j(y,x)«A(x)). To-
gether Bi and InvBi entail the novel prediction $r(In(x,r)ÙOut(y,r)ÙA(x)ÙB(y)) 
® "r(In(y,r)ÙOut(x,r)ÙB(y) ® A(x)). 
 In conclusion, Phlog-T was a rather successful theory in the mentioned do-
mains, provided one assumes (as we did) that these domains are described by 
means of qualitative chemistry, i.e., without a quantitative analysis of masses 
and mole numbers. This was the reason why Phlog-T was the dominating theory 
in the 18th century, in which chemistry was mainly qualitative. Of course, 
Phlog-T had also some purely qualitative explanation problems. For example, 
phlogiston theorists were unable to isolate phlogiston in a domain-independent 
way: Cavendish's identification of phlogiston with inflammable air (hydro-
genium gas) did not work in other domains such as the combustion of coal 
which has phlogisticated air (carbon dioxide) as its end product: it was never 
possible to gain inflammable gas from phlogisticated air. But phlogiston theory 
was not given up because of these problems, and several ad hoc hypotheses were 
invented to explain these difficulties (see Carrier 2006, “ 6). Also Lavoisier's 
oxygen theory faced some qualitative explanation problems. For example, we 
have mentioned that Lavoisier—s assumption that the acid's oxidation power was 
always the effect of the oxygen contained in the acid was refuted by hydrochlo-
ric acids and other halogen acids. These difficulties of Lavoisier's theory have 
been solved only much later by the generalized oxidation theory. 
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 The major reason why most chemists turned from Phlog-T to Ox-T in the 
very late 18th and beginning of the 19th century did not lie in its problems in the 
area of qualitative chemistry, but rather in the upcoming new methods and theo-
ries of quantitative chemistry (see also McCann 1978, 69, 78f). These were, in 
particular, the exact measurement of the weights of input and output substances 
of chemical reactions, and the acceptance of the law of constant proportions (so 
named by Proust, but first formulated by Lavoisier), according to which the sum 
of the weights of the input substances must balance that of the output sub-
stances. The problem was that the calcination of metals as described by Phlog-T 
seemed to violate this law, because assuming that phlogiston has positive or at 
least non-negative weight, the calx (= dephlogisticated metal) should weigh less 
than the metal, but it was found to weigh more. Also in regard to these difficul-
ties, phlogiston theorists first reacted with ad hoc explanations. For example, 
Louis-Bernard Guyton de Morveau argued that phlogisticated metals are lighter 
than dephlogisticated calxes because phlogiston is lighter than air and, hence, 
tends to lift the body upwards, like a balloon of helium gas.6 This sounded plau-
sible to many chemists, but scientists which were trained in quantitative physics 
found this argument to be defective: if equal volumes of a metal versus calx are 
put on two sides of a pair of scales, then the buoyancy force due to the dis-
placement of air is equal on both sides and, hence, plays no role. In order to ex-
plain the lower weight of the metal, one would have to assume that phlogiston 
has negative weight - which sounded very implausible and was not believed by 
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the majority of (former) phlogiston theorists. A more refined 'double cause' ad 
hoc explanation was suggested by Pierre J. Macquer in 1779: he assumed that 
phlogiston is the bearer of light (cf. Carrier 2006, “ 6). During combustion and 
calcination oxygen gets fixed as described by Lavoisier, and the fixed oxygen 
causes the increase of weight in the calx, but Macquer argued that the fixation of 
oxygen causes the release of phlogiston, which in turn causes the emission of 
light in the form of a flame. Macquer also argued that his hypothesis was able to 
explain the reduction of mercury calx with light from a burning glass, which 
Lavoisier cited as an anomaly for phlogiston theory. Although it was hard to re-
fute Macquer's double-cause hypothesis (oxygen and phlogiston), it could not 
compete with the much simpler oxygen theory of Lavoisier, which explained the 
reduction of mercury calx simply as the effect of heat.  
 We now turn to the illustration of our condition 2.2 on phlogiston theory. 
Which theoretical expression j can be found in Phlog-T (if any) which is char-
acterized by empirical indicators in the form of bilateral reduction sentences of 
the form ("x,u): Ai(x,u) ® (j(x) « Ri[x,u]) which entail Phlog-T's strong em-
pirical success? Interestingly, this expression is not "phlogiston" itself, because 
- as we have explained - phlogiston theory did not provide a general (domain-
independent) criterion of how phlogiston viewed as a kind of substance could be 
empirically identified. Thus, the theoretical kind term 'phlogiston' was empiri-
cally underdetermined in Phlog-T, and bilateral reduction sentences of the re-
quired sort did not exist for phlogiston. Rather, the theoretical expressions of 
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phlogiston theory which did all the empirically relevant work and were not em-
pirically underdetermined were the expressions of dephlogistication = the proc-
ess of releasing of phlogiston and phlogiston-richness = the tendency of a sub-
stance to release phlogiston, as well as the inverse expressions of phlogistication 
(assimilation of phlogiston) and phlogiston-poorness (tendency to absorb phlo-
giston). For these expressions Phlog-T entails indeed bilateral reduction state-
ments of the required sort, different ones for different domains Ai, namely the 
following:  
 
Bi's for dephlogistication [resp. for phlogiston-richness]: If an input substance x 
of kind Xi (e.g., a metal) is exposed to the influence of an input substance y of 
type Yi at time t (e.g. hydrochloric acid), then x gets dephlogisticated at t [or: x 
is phlogiston-rich] iff ($z:) x and y cause a chemical reaction which produces 
output substances z of type Zi = fi(Xi, Yi) at t (e.g., the metal dissolves and in-
flammable air evaporates). 
 
These Bi's have exactly the general form (Bi) explained in “  1.7 Note that while 
"dephlogistication" refers to a time-dependent process, "phlogiston-richness" re-
fers to an intrinsic, i.e. non-time-dependent property. The Bi's for 'phlogistica-
tion' and 'phlogiston-poorness' are obtained in an analogous way.  
 Conditions 2 and 3 have already been motivated in the previous section. So 
we proceed immediately to the illustration of our correspondence theorem. 
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There does indeed exist a correspondence of Phlog-T with generalized oxidation 
theory of modern chemistry, which goes further than the identification of phlo-
gistication with oxidation in Lavoisier's sense. To explain this correspondence 
we need a bit more of modern chemistry (cf. Oxtoby et al. 1999, ch. 3, ch. 6.3).  
Every substance consists of molecules, and molecules consist of atomic ele-
ments bound together by chemical bonds. The electropositivity of an element 
measures its tendency to contribute electrons to its neighboring atoms in electri-
cally polarized or ionic bonds. Conversely, the electronegativity measures the 
tendency of an element to attract electrons from the neighboring atom in polar-
ized or ionic bonds. Metals and hydrogenium are electropositive; carbonium is 
in the middle of the spectrum, and non-metals such as oxygen are electronega-
tive, with the extremes being the halogens. Oxidation of an elementary sub-
stance X (a metal, coal, etc.) in the generalized sense consists in the formation 
of a polarized or ionic bond of X with an electronegative substance Y, in which 
the atomic elements of X are electropositive and thus donate electrons to the 
electronegative neighbor Y in the bond. Every process of combustion, calcina-
tion or salt-formation consists of such an oxidation process. The inversion of the 
process of oxidation is called the process of reduction: here the polarized or io-
nic bond between an electropositive X-ion and its electronegative neighbor is 
broken, X regains its missing electrons and reappears in its pure elementary 
form. Therefore we have the following correspondence relations between phlo-
giston theory and modern chemistry: 
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Correspondence relations between phlogiston theory and modern chemistry: 
Phlogiston-richness of X corresponds (and indirectly refers) to the electroposi-
tivity of X.8 
Phlogiston-poorness of X corresponds (and indirectly refers) to the electronega-
tivity of X. 
Dephlogistication of X corresponds (and indirectly refers) to the donation of 
electrons of X-atoms to their bonding partner in the formation of a polarized or 
ionic chemical bond. 
Phlogistication of X corresponds (and indirectly refers) to the acceptance of 
electrons by positively charged X-ions from their bonding partner in the break-
ing of a polarized or ionic chemical bond.    
 
These relations of correspondence and indirect reference hold indeed generally, 
i.e., it is not the case that Ox-T would contain several possible counterpart con-
cepts for "phlogiston-richness" and "dephlogistication" (recall the discussion at 
the end of “  1). The failure of phlogiston theory was that dephlogistication of a 
substance x was thought of as a process in which a special chemical part of x, 
called phlogiston, leaves x. The electrons do not leave the substance but just 
move a little bit to the electronegative neighbors in the molecules. What really is 
emitted as the end product of an oxidation process (besides the oxidized mate-
rial) depends on the oxidant, that is, the input substance which causes the oxida-
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tion and which spends the electronegative partner - oxidation of coal by oxygen 
leads to carbon dioxide, while oxidation of a metal with acid leads to hydro-
genium gas. Therefore we have no correspondence for phlogiston. But we have 
correspondence for the composite terms of dephlogistication and phlogiston-
richness, and these correspondence relations explain the strong empirical suc-
cess of phlogiston theory in terms of modern chemistry.  
 It is clear from the foregoing that correspondence relations do not preserve 
all of the meaning of 'phlogistication' or 'phlogiston-richness'. Therefore, they 
cannot be regarded as an analytic truths, but have to be regarded as a synthetic 
statements which are true in the domain of applications in which phlogiston the-
ory was empirically successful. The fact that the corresponding expressions j of 
Phlog-T are not primitive but composite expressions is ontologically crucial. For 
whenever T's expression j corresponds to j* of T*, but the ontology of the old 
theory T concerning the entities involved in j is incompatible with the contem-
porary theory T*, then it will be the case that j is not a primitive but a complex 
expression of T, and T will contain certain theoretical assumptions about j's in-
ner structure or composition which from the viewpoint of T* are falseε for ex-
ample, that 'dephlogistication' is a process in which a special substance different 
from ordinary matter, called 'phlogiston', leaves the combusted substance. While 
T has got a right model about j's outer structure, i.e. the causal relations bet-
ween the complex entity j and the empirical phenomena, it has got a wrong 
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model about j's inner structure.  
 I think that this situation is typical even for most advanced contemporary 
theories. For example, we are confident that protons exist because they are mea-
surable common causes of a huge variety of Bi's. But concerning the hypothesis 
about the inner composition of protons consisting of three quarks things are dif-
ferent: physicists cannot measure quarks in isolation and, hence, are much more 
uncertain about their reality. In other words, the conception of realistic reference 
which is supported by the correspondence theorem is compatible with a certain 
amount of empirical underdetermination even in our most advanced theories 
(quantum mechanics is a case in point; cf. Ladyman 1998, 418f). 
 My notions of the outer and inner structure of a complex expression or entity 
j reflect Worrall's (1989) distinction between 'structure' and 'content' in an onto-
logically unproblematic way which is not threatened by the objections of Psillos 
(1995, 31ff): the 'structure' which is preserved is j's outer structure, while the 
'content' which is not preserved is j's inner structure. Often, the preserved outer 
structure of a T-expression j1 does not only contain j1's relations to observable 
phenomena, but covers also j1's relation to other T-theoretical terms j2 for 
which a T*-correspondence can also be established. In this sense, the relation 
between dephlogistication and phlogistication as inverse chemical reactions is 
preserved in modern chemistry. To elaborate the notions of 'inner' and 'outer 
structure' in a more general way would be an important task for future work.   
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3. Non-unique Correspondence: Classical and Relativistic Mass 9 
 
Two further applications of the correspondence theorem are illustrated in Schurz 
(2009, “ 5): one example is the caloric theory of heat, with the correspondence 
between the amount of caloric particles in a substance X and the mean kinetic 
energy of X's molecules, and the other example is Fresnel's mechanical wave 
theory of light, with the correspondence between the oscillation velocity of ether 
molecules and the oscillation strength of the electromagnetic field in Maxwell's 
account. In both examples, there exists a unique correspondence concept j* in 
T*. But not always is the situation so nice. In this section we discuss an example 
of non-unique correspondence: the correspondence between classical and rela-
tivistic mass. In an early paper Field (1973) has used this example to argue for 
the indeterminacy of the reference of the theoretical concept of the mass mN(x) 
of a physical body x in Newtonian physics T, thereby assuming special relativity 
theory T* as the true theory. We show now how we can make sense of Field's 
argument within the framework of the correspondence theorem.  
 Special relativity theory T* has two concepts of mass, the rest mass m0(x), 
and relativistic mass mr(x,f) := m0(x) / g(x,f), with g(x,f) := 2
2
c
f)v(x,1-  , which 
depends on the relation of the velocity v(x,f) of x as measured in inertial frame f 
to c (the velocity of light). Field (1973, 467-470) argues that some parts of what 
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we have called the 'outer structure' of Newtonian mass, for example its relation 
to momentum p(x,f) = mN(x)×v(x,f), are preserved in T* if mN is identified with 
mr. Other parts of T's content, as for example the conservation of mN in different 
inertial frames, i.e. mN's velocity-independence, are preserved in T* by identify-
ing mN with m0. This part of T's content can only be formulated if Newtonian 
mass is augmented by an additional argument place f for the inertial frame in 
which mN is measured; - then it says simply that ("f,f')(mN(x,f) = mN(x,f'). 
 Field concludes from this situation that it is objectively undetermined wheth-
er Newton's mass refers to rest mass or to relativistic mass. Earman (1977) ob-
jected to Field that the four-dimensional coordinate-free reformulation of New-
tonian physics and relativity theory provides independent reasons for identifying 
mN with m0 (in an appendix to Earman 1977, Fine added evidence that also Ein-
stein thought that mN should be identified with m0). Nevertheless the fact re-
mains that some of T's content parts are preserved by identifying mN with mr but 
are lost if mN is identified with m0.   
 In our account, the situation is resolved as follows. First of all, we have to 
identify the domain of application AN in which Newtonian physics T had strong 
success which was preserved in relativistic physics T*. Obviously, this is he 
domain in which the velocities are small compared to c. More precisely, the ve-
locities v(x,f) should be small enough to ensure that g(x,f) deviates from 1 by 
less than a given measurement inaccuracy e - let us call this upper velocity 
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bound v(e) (calculation yields v(e) = c× ö)2(ö -× ). Thus, the domain description 
'AN(x,f)' is defined as 'v(x,t) £ v(e)'. Next, in the case of quantitative theories, 
correspondence relations do not have the form of equivalences but of identities 
(recall the remark below the schema (Bi) in “  1), and moreover, they do never 
hold in a strict but only in an approximate form. Thus, the correspondence rela-
tion between mN of T and the corresponding mass concept m* of T* (whatever it 
is) will have the form  
 
(Correspondence for mass): ("x,f): A(x,f) ® (mN[x,f] @e m*[x,f]).  
 
Here "@e" stands for e-approximate identity (precisely defined below), and in the 
formulation of "m*[x,f]" we have left it open whether m* is rest mass m0(x) or 
relativistic mass mr(x,f) (so we have chosen the square bracket notation '[x,f]' for 
the free variables of mN as well as of m*; recall the 'notation' below 'Si,j' in “  1).  
 Let us now see how a correspondence between T and T* can be derived 
along the lines of our correspondence theorem. The domain A(x,f) divides into 
several qualitatively different subdomains (earthly motions described by ballistic 
curves, mechanical oscillations, planetary motions, etc.). Within each domain, 
mN is characterized by measurement laws (bilateral reduction statements) of the 
form (Bi): Ai(x,f) ® (mN[x,f] = ri[x,f]); for example "if x is put on a balanced 
beam, then mN(x) = k grams iff the number of one gram units (r i(x)) on the other 
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side of the balanced beam is k". These measurement laws for mN entail various 
potentially novel predictions of the (variable-suppressed) form (Si:) (AiÙRi) ® 
(Aj®Rj), for example, "if a body x balances k standard units on a pair of scales, 
then it will compress a given spring balance by such-and-such amount". All 
these novel predictions (Si) are approximately preserved in special relativity the-
ory T*, in a T*-dependent way, i.e. by way of T*-theoretical functional expres-
sions m*[x,t] which figure as theoretical mediators between (AiÙRi) and 
(Aj®Rj). Special relativity theory T* has two such theoretical mediators to of-
fer, rest mass m0 and relativistic mass mr. The key point to observe here is that 
within the domain of application A(x,f), both possible theoretical counterparts 
are approximately equivalent, i.e. it holds that  
 
(*) ("x,f): A(x,f) ® m0(x,f) @e mr(x,f),  
 
whereby the precise meaning of "mr @e m0" as following from the above conven-
tion for v(e) is given as "(mr-m0)/m0 £ e". (More generally, ' x @e y' is definable 
as '|x-y| £ e×min({x,y}').) Indeed, (*) follows already from corollary 2 and the 
assumption that both T*-mediators m0 as well as mr work in all subdomains of 
A(x,f) - which is, of course, the case, because the defining condition for A(x,f), 
namely 1-g (x,f) £ e, is mathematically equivalent with (mr-m0)/m0 £ e. In the 
present example, however, T* contains mr and m0 as distinct theoretical con-
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cepts: although they are approximately identical in the domain A(x,f) in which T 
was successful, they depart from each other significantly in situations of veloci-
ties which are significantly higher than the threshold v(e). This is exactly the 
situation of non-unique correspondence relations between T and T*, whose 
theoretical possibility was discussed at the end of “  1. It follows that for the cor-
responding mass concept m*[x,f] of T* one might choose m0(x) or mr(x,f) or 
even an average of the two (which would correspond to a 'disjunction' in the 
qualitative case). 
 In conclusion, the considerations of this section have shown that the corre-
spondence theorem can also be applied to quantitative theories such as classical 
versus relativistic mechanics, provided strict identities are replaced by approxi-
mate ones. More importantly, these applications may reveal important insights, 
such as the existence of several non-identical relativistic counterparts to Newto-
nian mass, which are approximately identical in the domain of application in 
which Newtonian physics was successful. 
   
 4. Outlook: Consequences for the Justification of Scientific Realism  
 
In this final section I want to give a brief sketch of how the correspondence 
theorem may justify a weak version of scientific realism. Most scientific realists 
base their arguments on some version of the no miracles argument (NMA) 
which was explained in “  1. What my account shares with the critics or scien-
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tific realism is the skeptical attitude concerning the unrestricted NMA. The ma-
jor argument against the NMA in my view is the fact explained in “  1: if the 
theory T does not satisfy the common cause condition (2), but speculates for 
each kind of phenomenon a special cause, then there is no way to infer from its 
empirical success something about the truth-status of its theoretical part. There-
fore the unrestricted version of the NMA is false. Only a restricted version of it 
is tenable.  
 My account does in no place presuppose the NMA. It is based on an analytic 
theorem. Together with empirical-historical evidence concerning the truth of 
conditions 1-4, the correspondence theorem establishes independently from the 
NMA or some other form of IBE (inference to the best explanation) why a spe-
cifically restricted version of the NMA can be defended. Of course, the corre-
spondence theorem alone justifies only a conditional realism: if one assumes the 
(approximate) realistic truth of the presently accepted theory T*, then also out-
dated theories T (satisfying the conditions) will contain a (theoretico-structural) 
content-part which is indirectly and hence partially true. This conditional real-
ism weakens Laudan's pessimistic meta-induction. But conditional realism alone 
is not sufficient to justify scientific realism. For someone who, on independent 
epistemological grounds, does not believe that contemporary or future scientific 
theories are approximately true, this conditional realism cannot tell anything 
about the partial truth of earlier theories.  
 But the situation changes if one makes the following assumption of minimal 
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realism (MR): 
 
(MR) The observed phenomena are caused by an external reality whose struc-
ture can possibly be represented in an approximate way by an ideal theory T+ 
which is causally normal, entails the observed phenomena in a T+-dependent 
way, and whose language is in reach of humans' logico-mathematical resources. 
 
(MR) is a minimal realistic assumption because it merely says that an approxi-
mately true theory describing the reality which causes the observed phenomena 
in a humanly accessible language is possible - independent of whether humans 
will ever find this theory. Together with (MR), the correspondence theorem en-
tails that the abductive inference from the strong empirical success of theories to 
their partial realist truth is justified. For if (MR) is true, then there exists an ap-
proximately true ideal theory T+, which need not be known to us and preserves 
all of the strong empirical success which our accepted theories have. So the cor-
respondence theorem implies that every (theoretico-structural) content-part of 
our contemporary theories satisfying the conditions 2 (plus 1 and 4) corresponds 
to a content part of the ideal theory T+, and hence is indirectly true. In this way, 
my account may provide an independent and non-circular justification of a weak 
version of the NMA, or of the abductive inference to the partial truth of strongly 
successful theories.  
 A detailed elaboration and defense of this justification of a weak version of 
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scientific realism must be left to another paper. But let me emphasize that the 
correspondence theorem need not be interpreted in this realistic way. It makes 
also good sense without the assumption of minimal realism. In the non-realistic 
interpretation of the correspondence theorem, the ideal theory 'T+' would no 
longer reflect the structure of an external reality, but would be an idealized con-
struction expressing that the historical succession of more and more successful 
theories converges to some fictitious end (e.g., in the sense of Charles S. Peirce). 
Such a notion of convergence by correspondence makes sense in my account, 
because the notion of correspondence between theories can be shown to be tran-
sitive.10 Convergence to a limit theory T+ by way of correspondence relations 
has to be understood in terms of less-and-less partial truth: that part of the theo-
retical superstructure which matches the structure of the ideal theory T+, or in 
realists terms, the structure of external reality, becomes more and more compre-
hensive. In this sense, my account satisfies Carnap's requirement of metaphysi-
cal neutrality. 
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Notes 
 
1  The existence of a j*i(x) which is independent from j is required in Schurz (2008, “ 4, 
'definition'); but in “ 3 of the same paper it is shown that the requirement of i,j-dependent 
mediators is sufficient, because j*i(x) is definable as Ù{j*i,j: 1£j£n, j¹i}. 
2  Apart from that qualification, I do not assume a particular theory of reference. 
3  This critical remark has been independently made by Bas van Fraassen and Kevin Kelly.   
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4  in his 1697 paper "Zymotechnia Fundamentals", Georg. E. Stahl coined the term "phlogis-
ton" as a renaming of 'terra pinguis' introduced by his teacher Johann. J. Becher. In his 
"Physical Education" 1667, Becher modified the traditional (Aristotelean and alchemist) 
four-element model (earth, water, air and fire) by replacing 'air' and 'fie' by 'terra pinguis' 
as the 'fiery element' which is released when substances are burned (see "prelude to mod-
ern chemistry", http://hilltop.bradley.edu/~rbg/com.html). 
5  Novel predictions of scientists will often have the apparently different form 'an x of kind a 
will exhibit reactions Rj(x) under conditions Aj(x)', where 'a' is a theoretical statement. 
But the empirical indicators for 'x is of kind a' will (after some transformations) again 
have the form 'under conditions Ai(x), Ri(x) has happened'.  
6  Cf. Wikipedia (English), entry "phlogiston" (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phlogiston). 
7  I am indebted to Edward Zalta for getting the free variables of this example right.  
8  James Ladyman pointed me towards the correspondence for phlogiston-richness. 
9  I am grateful to Hans Rott for pointing me to this example. 
10  This possibility was pointed out to me independently by Michael Friedman and Brandon 
Fitelson. A detailed proof is left to further papers.    
